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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we describe recent developments in the rental market for agricultural land in selected 
EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on the importance of the rental 
market as well as on the evolution of rental prices. It appears that the share of rented land in the total 
utilised agricultural area varies considerably among member states. In the old member states, the 
share of rented land ranges between 18% in Ireland and 74% in France, while in the new member 
states (NMS) it ranges from 17% in Romania to 89% in Slovakia. For the former, different strategies to 
provide tenure security to tenants can explain differences in the importance of rental markets. 
Changes in the significance of land rental have also reflected changes in institutions and in economic 
and political conditions. In the NMS, diverse approaches to land reform have resulted in assorted 
ownership structures and hence in differences in the share of rented land. Regarding rental prices, 
governments impose price restrictions on agricultural land rents in some countries, such that large 
divergences are observed in rental prices between and within member states. 
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1. Introduction 
The efficiency of agricultural land markets can be studied by looking at the incidence of sales 
and rental transactions, as well as the magnitude and evolution of land sales and rental 
prices. Theoretically, if markets are perfect and transaction costs are insignificant, then 
farmers would be indifferent in accessing land through sales or rental and the sales prices for 
agricultural land would be equal to the net present, productive value of land, while the land 
rental price would be equal to the marginal product of land. In that case, sales and rental 
prices would be expected to change in parallel. Yet this might not be the case in the presence 
of market imperfections. 
In particular, credit market imperfections and transaction costs play an important role. First, 
where capital markets work imperfectly, land purchases typically have to be financed out of 
own savings. Second, where financial markets do not work efficiently or where confidence in 
money as a repository of value is low, land may be used to store wealth and may be acquired 
for speculative purposes. Third, in the absence of alternative investment or hedging options, 
land may be purchased or held onto as a hedge against inflation or as an investment asset. 
Fourth, with constrained access to credit, much needed capital is tied up by investment in 
land, preventing farmers from using these savings to invest in technology, equipment or 
quality inputs. Furthermore, people hold land for many reasons other than production, such 
as prestige value, lifestyle value and family traditions, with wealthy and politically connected 
households accumulating large tracts of land. Owing to some of these factors, land sales 
prices typically seem higher than the productive value of land (Binswanger et al., 1993). 
Finally, transaction costs (including the enforcement of property rights, access to necessary 
documents and approval by local officials) not only imply a premium that needs to be paid by 
the buyer, but also that significant losses can be incurred when buying and re-selling land, 
additionally preventing flexible adjustments of land use through land sales (Carter and 
Zimmerman, 2000; de Janvry et al., 2001). 
Based on the above arguments, it appears that it is expensive and difficult for efficient 
producers to buy land, while market imperfections reduce the incentives for less efficient 
producers to sell their land. These factors indicate that land markets require a premium over 
                                                        
* Pavel Ciaian and d’Artis Kancs are working at the European Commission (DG Joint Research 
Centre); Johan F.M. Swinnen is a Senior Research Fellow at CEPS and Director of the LICOS Centre 
for Institutions and Economic Performance at KU Leuven; Kristine Van Herck is a PhD Student at the 
LICOS Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance at KU Leuven; Liesbet Vranken is an 
Assistant Professor at the Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, at KU Leuven. 
The paper draws importantly on background information and comments provided by Eleni Kaditi 
(CEPS). The authors are solely responsible for the content of the paper. The views expressed are purely 
those of the authors and may not in any circumstances be regarded as stating an official position of the 
European Commission. 
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their expected production value to be included in the sales prices. As a consequence, sales 
markets for rural land might be thin and sales prices do not necessarily evolve in parallel with 
land rental prices; market institutions and imperfections may influence these conditions.  
In 2004 and 2007, ten and two countries respectively acceded to the EU in its enlargement 
with countries in Eastern and Central Europe. Until 1989, the agricultural sector in these 
countries was regulated, and dominated by large-scale state and collective farms. There were 
only two exceptions, Poland and the former Yugoslavian countries, where collectivisation 
largely failed, such that a considerable share of agricultural land was already being used by 
individual farmers during the communist era (Lerman, 2001). Because the history of 
collective land use has had a long lasting impact on the functioning of the land market and 
the region has undergone such radical changes in the past two decades, in discussing rental 
market developments in this paper we make a distinction between the old member states 
(OMS) and the new member states (NMS).1 In addition, we highlight the most important 
evolutions in the farmland rental markets for three candidate countries: Croatia, the Former 
Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Turkey. But it should be noted that the land 
markets of these candidate countries are analysed in more detail in the Factor Markets 
Working Paper by Bojnec (2011). 
In this paper, we describe recent developments in the rental market for agricultural land in 
the selected EU member states, while another Factor Markets Working Paper, by Ciaian et al. 
(2012a), looks at recent developments in the sales market. We discuss the differences 
observed among the member states as well as the importance of the rental market (i.e. the 
share of rented land in total agricultural land) and the evolution of rental prices. For the 
analysis, we draw upon earlier work by Ciaian et al. (2010), Swinnen and Vranken (2009, 
2010) and a questionnaire that was sent to the different partners of the Factor Markets 
project. 
2. Importance of the rental market 
The share of rented land in the total utilised agricultural area (UAA) varies considerably 
among EU member states (Figure 1). In the OMS, the share of rented land ranges between 
18% in Ireland and 74% in France, while in the NMS it ranges from 17% in Romania to 89% 
in Slovakia (Table 1). In Turkey, approximately 39% of the land is rented, of which 21% is 
done so under traditional, fixed rental contracts and 18% under sharecropping rental 
arrangements.2 In Croatia, approximately 42% of the total UAA is rented (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency, 2006). 
Figure 1 illustrates that the share of rented land is high in some NMS as well as in some OMS. 
As such, these numbers indicate that land renting can be an important part of modern 
agricultural systems. One of the main advantages of rental over sales transactions in these 
economies is that, in a capital-intensive production system, and with the possibility of using 
other assets as collateral, farms prefer to invest in new technology and farm-specific assets 
rather than tie up large sums of capital in land purchases. In Western Europe, many farms 
have both owned and rented land, and the proportion of such mixed land use increases with 
the size of the farm (Feenstra, 1992). In this way, farms in these countries combine not only 
tenure security (with their assets and long-term investment concentrated on owned land) and 
flexibility in land allocation, but also they free up capital for other investments (by renting 
additional land rather than buying it). 
                                                        
1 The selected OMS in this study are Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the UK. The NMS are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. The selection of these countries is based 
on data availability.  
2 Data for Turkey are based on survey results in the Osmaniye Province of Turkey by Özüdoğru (2011).  
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Figure 1. Share of rented land as a % of the total UAA in 2007 
 
Source: Eurostat (Farm Structure Survey). 
There are several reasons for the differences in the importance of rental markets among the 
EU member states. 
In the OMS, different strategies to provide tenure security to tenants can explain distinctions 
in the importance of rental markets. In particular, the historical evolution of these rental 
arrangements provides some notable insights. The significance and nature of land rental has 
changed considerably throughout history. Historically, European countries were dominated 
by large landlord–small tenant relations, with weak bargaining power for tenants, resulting 
in poor tenure security and few tenant rights, albeit with substantial variations across the 
region. 
Changes in the importance of land rental have reflected changes in institutions and in 
economic and political conditions (Swinnen, 2002). Key economic factors have included 
changes in agricultural profitability, with falling world market prices inducing distress sales 
by farmers (especially in the first part of the 20thcentury), and the emergence of non-farm 
employment opportunities, which weakened landlords’ bargaining position vis-à-vis tenant 
households. 
Still, the most critical changes have been caused by institutional and political shifts, affecting 
land taxes and tenure regulations. Early on in the 20thcentury, landlords dominated 
governments in Europe. With industrialisation and the distribution of voting rights to small 
farmers and tenants, all this changed. The result was increased land and inheritance taxes in 
some countries, forcing many landlords to sell part of their estate. In other countries, 
improved political representation for tenants led to new regulations, giving tenants more 
security of operation and better conditions in the event of contract termination, such as 
compensation for land improvements, automatic rights for rent renewal and first-buyer 
options. 
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In broad terms, one can distinguish two types of policy strategies to improve the situation of 
tenants. The first strategy was to improve the rental conditions for tenants through 
regulations. The second strategy was to help tenants become owners of the land. 
The first strategy was followed in countries such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, 
where rent regulations were introduced primarily with the aim of improving the tenure 
security for farmers. These were not introduced all at once, but incremental increases 
throughout the 20thcentury led to a situation where farmers no longer wanted to purchase 
land because their tenure security was very high, and they could use their capital for other 
investments. In these countries, the rental share is relatively high. 
The second strategy, i.e. to help tenants become landowners, was the dominant strategy in 
countries like Denmark, Italy and Ireland. There, the government set up state funds to 
purchase farms for poor tenants or to subsidise the latter’s purchase of land (or both), either 
directly or indirectly through regulating prices, subsidised loan conditions or tax benefits for 
purchasing land. Notice that in all of these countries, the share of land rental is relatively low. 
The most dramatic impact occurred in Ireland, where almost all land was rented at the 
beginning of the 20thcentury, having since declined to around 17% nowadays. 
In the UK,3 improvements in the situation of tenants followed from a mixed approach. The 
decline in political power of the large landlords resulted in important changes in the rights of 
tenants, such as the right to determine crop rotations, the right to determine the purchases 
and sales of farm products, and the right for compensation if they were to leave the land. 
Later on, additional rental regulations were introduced, as well as the creation of Land 
Tribunals for the resolution of conflicts between landowners and tenants. Another major 
change was the increase of land and inheritance taxes, along with the shift of income taxes 
from tenants to landlords. In combination, these policy changes contributed to) better and 
more secure rights for tenants and ii) a decline of tenancy, as landlords sold their land to 
tenants. 
In summary, the same policy objectives have led to different policies, institutions and tenure 
situations in the OMS. 
In the NMS, diverse approaches to land reform have resulted in assorted ownership 
structures and hence in differences in the share of rented land. The most important land 
reform choices were restitution or distribution (in kind – actual plots – or in land shares), or 
a combination of both. These differences can have major implications for the role of rental 
markets in these countries. 
A central difference between the restitution of land to former owners and the distribution of 
plots or shares to farm workers and rural households is that with restitution,4 a significant 
share of the land is (potentially) allocated to individuals who are not (or are no longer) active 
in agriculture. They may be retired or living in urban areas. This has several implications for 
the development of land markets. First, there is probably more need for an exchange of land, 
since retired and urban households are less likely to use land than rural households that are 
active in agriculture. Second, restitution is more likely to lead to a consolidation of the large-
scale farming structures (collective and state farms in the past, now corporate farms), 
because corporate farm management, which was the historical user of the land, has 
transaction cost advantages in dealing with the new owners (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). 
For both reasons, the restitution of land is associated with more land exchanges, including 
renting. 
In addition, imperfections in input, product, credit and insurance markets affect the 
functioning of land markets (Vranken and Swinnen, 2006; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2009; Van 
                                                        
3 Strictly speaking, many of the arguments here on the ‘UK’ solely apply to England and Wales, since 
Scotland had somewhat different land policies.  
4 This has been the case in the Czech and Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, the Baltic States and large parts 
of Romania and Hungary. 
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Herck et al., 2011). Credit and capital markets play a crucial role, especially in land sales in 
the NMS. Capital market imperfections may constrain the efficiency of land sales markets in 
several ways. First, where capital markets work imperfectly, land purchases typically have to 
be financed out of own savings. Second, where financial markets do not work well or where 
confidence in money as a repository of value is low, land may be used to store wealth and 
may be acquired for speculative purposes. Third, land may be purchased or held on to as a 
hedge against inflation or as an investment asset in the absence of alternative investment or 
hedging options. Fourth, with constrained access to credit, investment in land ties up much 
needed capital in land, and prevents farmers from using these savings for investment in 
technology, equipment or quality inputs. These factors mean that the sales price for land will 
often be higher than the productive value of land. This usually results in a thin sales market 
and higher demand for the exchange of land through rental. Especially during the 1990s, 
credit market imperfections were widespread across all transition countries. These problems 
have been mitigated substantially since EU accession, as credit from banks and other rural 
financial institutions, along with contracts with agribusinesses, have reduced credit 
constraints for farms. Nevertheless, in many poor NMS these constraints remain very 
significant. 
Transaction costs can also be high in the case of land sales, so land rental markets play a 
critical role in the exchange of land from less to more productive land users. The transaction 
costs include the traditional costs, for instance notary fees and registration costs. In the NMS, 
however, individuals who want to sell their agricultural land are sometimes also confronted 
by additional transaction costs, such as high withdrawal costs, insecure property rights and 
imperfect competition on the land market (Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). 
In any case, for most countries there is a difference in the share of rented land depending on 
whether data is obtained from the Farm Structure Surveys (FSS, presented in Figure 1 and 
the first column of Table 1) or from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) (the second 
column of Table 1). In general, the share of rented land calculated based on the FADN data is 
slightly higher than that obtained from the FSS data. For example, the FADN data for 
Belgium show that 74% of the land is rented, while the figure is 67% in the FSS data. This 
difference may relate to the fact that there is sample selection in the FADN dataset and the 
smallest farms, which typically cultivate their own land and do not participate in the rental 
market, are excluded from the sample. Especially in the NMS, these small-scale farmers may 
represent a substantial share of the land market (e.g. in Romania). 
Table 1. Share of rented land as a % of the total UAA in 2007 
Old member states 
 FSS FADN 
Belgium 67 74 
Germany 62 70 
Greece 32 48 
Finland 34 35 
France  74 85 
Ireland 18 18 
Italy  28 41 
Netherlands 25 40 
Spain  27 35 
Sweden 39 53 
UK 32 43 
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Table 1. cont’d 
New member states 
 FSS FADN 
Bulgaria 79 87 
Czech Republic 83 86 
Estonia 50 59 
Hungary 56 66 
Latvia 27 43 
Lithuania 48 59 
Poland 20 30 
Romania 17 48 
Slovakia 89 96 
Sources: Data for the first column are based on the FSS obtained by Eurostat (2007) and data for the 
second column are based on calculations from the FADN (2008). 
In the rest of the paper, where we study the dynamics in the use of rented land we use FADN 
data. For some countries, these data are slightly different from the data presented in Figure 1 
and Table 1, as they are derived from a different source. Figure 2 presents the data for the 
OMS, while Figure 3 presents the data for selected NMS. 
Figure 2. Share of rented land in the total UAA in the OMS (%) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the FADN database. 
In most countries, the share of rented land in the total UAA remained relatively stable over 
the period 1995–2008 (OMS) or 2004–08 (NMS). In Belgium, the Netherlands, Estonia and 
Lithuania, the share of rented land slightly decreased. In France, Sweden, Austria, the UK 
and Poland, there was a (weak) increase in the share of rented area. In the other countries, 
such as Germany, Greece, Finland and Italy, the share of rented land grew more significantly. 
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Figure 3. Share of rented land in the total UAA in the NMS (%) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on the FADN database. 
In the remainder of this section, we split our sample of EU countries according to their share 
of rented land and discuss some country-specific features of the rental market in the different 
member states. 
2.1 Countries with a high share of rented land (>70% of the total UAA) 
Countries that fall under this heading include Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, France, 
Belgium and Germany. 
Among all EU member states, Slovakia and the Czech Republic have the highest shares of 
rented land, as respectively 89% and 83% of all UAA is rented. A considerable amount of land 
in the Czech Republic is still owned by the state, but even if we look solely at private land 
rentals, it becomes clear that 74% of the UAA is rented by private individuals. 
Most of the land that is rented is used by corporate farms (the successors of the state farms), 
which still dominate the agricultural sector in these countries. The dominance of corporate 
farms and the consequent high share of rented land are closely related to the land reform 
process that was implemented at the beginning of transition (see also Box 1 in Ciaian et al., 
2012b). Land was restituted to former owners, among whom the majority are not (or are no 
longer) active in agriculture. They may be retired or living in urban areas and are more likely 
to rent it out, particularly to large-scale corporate farms, for several reasons. 
First, because of the limited information about sales prices and the expected increase in land 
prices upon accession to the EU, most of these new landowners were unwilling to sell their 
newly acquired land assets and instead preferred to rent out the land. 
Second, since identifying potential tenants involves search and negotiation costs, the easiest 
way for the new landowners was to rent their land to the corporate farms, which had been the 
historical users of the land (Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998). 
Third, as corporate management was closely involved in the land reform process, the search 
and negotiation costs of corporate management to identify and contract with the new owners 
were significantly lower than the costs faced by newly emerging structures (particularly 
family farms and de novo companies). 
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Land rental is also very widespread in Bulgaria, where 79% of the land is rented (Swinnen 
and Vranken, 2010). Around 50% of the land is used by corporate farms, while the rest is 
used by sole traders5 (around 15%) and natural persons (around 35%). The land used by 
corporate farms and sole traders is mostly rented from households. The remaining land is 
used by small family farms, which tend to work their own land. 
Over recent years, the share of land that is rented and the number of rental transactions have 
increased in Bulgaria (Table 2). In 2001, 281,000 ha of land were rented, with this figure 
rising to 374,000 ha in 2007 (in 2008, the surface that was rented fell back to 328,000 ha). 
The number of rental transactions grew from 120,000 in 2001 to 180,000 in 2007 and then 
fell back to 155,000 in 2008. 
Table 2. Land rental transactions in Bulgaria 
 Rented area (‘000 ha) 
Region 2001 2002 2003 2006 2007 2008 
North-West 28.76 44.83 40.13 56.04 40.43 40.71 
North Central 44.15 52.67 76.94 108.14 132.19 139.22 
North-East 139.60 74.52 127.83 135.72 115.01 95.93 
South-East 21.69 32.08 32.66 38.95 30.40 24.70 
South Central 43.10 29.23 47.28 29.14 47.48 18.06 
South-West 3.59 9.83 9.05 7.11 8.58 9.33 
Country – average 280.88 243.16 332.88 375.12 374.10 327.95 
 Number of rental contracts (‘000) 
North-West 12.13 31.61 16.34 19.23 12.05 19.48 
North Central 21.32 21.73 37.28 50.49 75.08 65.69 
North-East 57.19 32.97 47.95 50.95 51.56 50.49 
South-East 7.90 7.92 7.19 9.13 8.95 5.84 
South Central 19.29 10.11 31.86 13.26 28.20 8.76 
South-West 2.39 2.50 4.74 3.28 4.01 4.25 
Country – average 120.21 106.84 145.34 146.35 179.85 154.51 
Source: SAPI, obtained by Swinnen and Vranken (2010). 
In France, according to the FSS data the share of rented UAA was 74% in 2007, while 
according to the FADN data, 85% was rented in 2008. The share of rented land in FADN 
farms showed an upward trend, from approximately 77% in 1995 to 85% in 2008. 
Nevertheless, there are strong regional variations in the share of rented UAA. In Limousin, 
for example, the share of rented land among all the UAA was ‘only’ 68%, while it was 
substantially higher in Picardie, where 95% of all the UAA used by FADN farms was rented in 
2008 (Table 3). 
 
                                                        
5 A sole trader describes a business that is owned and controlled by one person, although the business 
may have employees. Generally speaking, the sole trader (i.e. owner) is also personally liable for the 
debts of the business. This is referred to as ‘unlimited liability’. 
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Table 3. Share of rented land in the total UAA in different regions in France in 2008 (%) 
Region Share of rented land Region Share of rented land 
Limousin 68 Corse 88 
Languedoc-Roussillon 70 Pays de la Loire 89 
Auvergne 77 Franche-Comté 89 
Midi-Pyrénées 77 Centre 89 
Aquitaine 78 Île de France 91 
Provence-Alpes-Côte 79 Lorraine 91 
Poitou-Charentes 80 Nord-Pas-de-Calais 92 
Rhônes-Alpes 82 Haute-Normandie 92 
Bretagne 82 Bourgogne 92 
France (total) 85 Champagne-Ardenne 93 
Alsace 86 Picardie 95 
Basse-Normandie 87   
Source: FADN (2011). 
In Belgium, the share of rented land was relatively stable at 68% and 74% of the total UAA, 
according to the FSS data and the FADN data, respectively. There were some historical 
regional differences in the share of rented land, but in all provinces more than 50% of the 
land was rented. Overall, the differences were rather small: according to FADN, 72% of the 
agricultural land in Flanders was rented, whereas in Wallonia the figure was 76%. 
The landowners who rent out their land are in most cases farmers who also rent in 
agricultural land themselves. This situation stems from the widespread fragmentation of 
agricultural land in Belgium and the zoning regulations, which (owing to the high population 
density) leads to a dispersion of agricultural land, particularly in Flanders. Hence, in the 
presence of positive transaction costs, it is possible that it is more profitable to rent out plots 
that are far from the main farm buildings and rent in plots that are close by if the plots of a 
farm household are dispersed. 
Also in Germany, the reallocation of agricultural land takes place mostly through the rental 
market. In 2008, 70% of the agricultural land used by FADN farms was rented (or 70% of the 
UAA in 2007, according to the FSS data). Overall, the share of rented land was considerably 
higher in Eastern Germany (80%) compared with Western Germany (60%) (Ciaian et al., 
2010). In contrast to Western Germany, where the share of rented land has increased over 
the past years, the share of rented land in Eastern Germany has been declining (in 1999, 90% 
of the land was rented). The reason for this decline is the improving economic situation and 
the increased access to credit, which also makes purchasing land a reasonable option. In 
addition to differences between East and West, there are also regional differences in the 
share of rented land, ranging between 45% in Bavaria to 90% in Saxony (Ciaian et al., 2010). 
In Bavaria, the share of rented land of the total UAA is lowest among all the federal states. In 
2005, about 83,100 farms rented 1,455,400 ha of the UAA, which equated to 45% of the total 
UAA. This total rent share breaks down to 40% of the rented area being used in full-time 
farming, 25% of the rented area in part-time farming and 52% of the rented area being used 
by legal entities. The main reason for the small volume of the land market in Bavaria is the 
farm structure that has naturally evolved, with individual family farms being predominant. 
One of their primary aims is to maintain family property. Farmers may prefer to work part-
time on their farm, instead of renting or selling the land. If they quit farming, they usually 
rent it out. 
The large size of the rental market in Lower Saxony can be linked not only to the specific farm 
structure of the region, but also, at least partly, to policy. One of the factors behind the 
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importance of the rental market is that farms with high densities of livestock increasingly 
need additional land to comply with the restrictions on organic nitrogen in the Nitrates 
Directive. 
2.2 Countries with a medium share of rented land (<70% and >50% of 
the total UAA) 
Countries that fall under this heading include Sweden, Estonia, Lithuania and Hungary. 
In Sweden, the share of rented agricultural land in the total UAA increased from 45% in 1995 
to approximately 53% in 2008, according to the FADN data. The FSS reported that around 
39% of the UAA was rented in 2007. 
In Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia, the share of rented land in the total UAA was between 
48% and 56% of the total UAA in 2007 (based on FSS data). Thus, it was substantially lower 
than the share of rented land in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, but higher than in Poland, 
Latvia and Slovenia. Like Slovakia and the Czech Republic, these differences are also related 
to the farm structure: in Slovakia and the Czech Republic, the sector was dominated by 
corporate farms, compared with a mix of corporate farms and family farms in Hungary, 
Lithuania and Estonia. 
In Hungary, the share of rented land declined by 4.2% between 2001 and 2003, but by 2005, 
it had increased again by around 3%. On average, rental was the basis for the exchange of 
more than 3 million ha of land, which is 30 times the amount of land that was exchanged 
through sales (Swinnen and Vranken, 2009). 
2.3 Countries with a low share of rented land (<50% of the total UAA) 
Countries that come under this description include Greece, the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Romania. 
Although recently the share of rented land in Greece has increased substantially, it is rather 
small, since agricultural land is usually cultivated by landowners and to a lesser extent by 
tenants. The owners usually rent out their property for just one farming period. Sometimes, 
but not that often, rental contracts last up to four years. 
In Greece, state-owned land is also rented. In the past, farmers used to pay in kind (about 20-
25% of total production), but there were some problems in terms of applying this method of 
payment. As a result, now farmers have to pay the value of production that they used to give 
as an in-kind payment. Cooperatives that redistribute or rent state-owned land to farmers 
have been created to facilitate the operation of this system. 
In the UK, the proportion of English farmland that is leased has remained relatively stable at 
approximately 36% (national statistics). In Scotland, there has been a continual decreasing 
trend in the proportion of Scottish farmland that is leased, falling from 41% in 1982 to 29% in 
2007. This is a long-term trend and the introduction of new types of leases in 2004 (see Box 
1) to stimulate the land market have failed to bring more land forward for leasing. In 
particular, landowners do not like the fact that new leases are either for a maximum of 5 
years or a minimum of 15 years with no scope for leasing arrangements between 5 and 15 
years (10 years was the average lease length under the former Limited Partnership for renting 
land in Scotland). 
In the Netherlands, the share of agricultural land rented by FADN farms was relatively stable 
for the period 1995–2008, at approximately 40% of the total UAA (or 25% of the UAA 
according to the FSS data). 
In Italy, the share of rented land in the total UAA used by FADN farms was approximately 
40% in 2008, while FSS and national data show that about 28% of the total UAA was rented 
in 2005 (Ciaian, et al., 2010). This share is very different among regions, varying from 45% 
(Val d’Aosta, Lombardia, Fruili Venezia Giulia) to below 15% (Trentino Alto Adige, Puglia, 
Calabria and Sicilia). 
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Box 1. Agricultural lease contracts in Scotland 
In Scotland there are now four forms of agricultural leases permitted under the 2003 Act.  
First, it is still possible to grant a new ‘traditional’ agricultural tenancy under the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991.  
Second, there are grazing leases for no more than 364 days. Failure to ensure that the land is 
vacated at the end of the grazing period means it becomes a 5-year short limited duration 
tenancy (SLDT).  
Third, SLDTs are agricultural leases for a term of no more than 5 years and are aimed at 
validating cropping lets (potatoes, turnips, etc). Tenants who occupy land under an SLDT are 
not allowed to diversify, nor are they able to exercise a pre-emptive right to buy their tenanted 
land.  
Fourth, limited duration tenancies (LDTs) were introduced as the standard form of tenancy. 
They must be for a minimum period of 15 years, but they can also be for longer by agreement. If 
the lease is not terminated by notice at its agreed termination date, it will continue for a further 
3-year period.  
Source: Ciaian et al. (2010). 
Overall, the rental market has been growing over time, although there has also been variation 
over time, which indicates major responsiveness to policy and market prices. Renting has 
become a critical component of structural change in the agricultural sector, and even in 
regions where renting is less widespread on average, it can be important for specific crops. 
Renting land is a particularly sensible step where it relates to livestock production (for 
manure spreading or foraging or both) or vegetable production (e.g. tomatoes), for which 
there are specific rotation limitations. 
In Spain and Portugal, more than 30% of the total UAA is rented or farmed under 
sharecropping arrangements. 
In Finland, the share of rented area has been steadily increasing since 1974. The relative 
increase in the share of rented land can be partially explained by the future expectations of 
land ownership, which are considerably higher than for the renting market (Ciaian et al., 
2010).  
In Ireland, most of the rented area is leased through the conacre system, which is unique to 
Ireland (and Northern Ireland) and entails the letting of land on a seasonal basis (nominally 
for 11 months or 364 days) without entering into a long-term commitment.  
In Latvia and Poland, the share of rented land in the total UAA used by FADN farms was 
equal to 43% and 30% respectively (or 27% and 20% respectively, according to the FSS data). 
As in the case of the other NMS, the structure of the rental market is related to the land 
reform process. In Poland and the countries of the former Yugoslav Republic, collectivisation 
largely failed, such that a considerable share of agricultural land was already being used by 
individual farmers during the communist era (Lerman, 2001). This is in contrast to the other 
NMS, where a large share of the land was used by corporate farms. 
Nevertheless, there was state-owned land in Poland and in 1994, land rental was the basis for 
transactions involving more than 1 million ha of public agricultural land, which decreased to 
less than 100,000 ha in 2005, with the continuing privatisation of public land (Figure 4). The 
annual volume of farmer-to-farmer rentals remained stable from 1994 to 2002, ranging 
between 320,000 and 375,000 ha. But in 2003 it fell to 230,000 ha. 
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Figure 4. Rental transactions in Poland (number) 
 
Sources: IERiGŻ and ANR, obtained by Swinnen and Vranken (2009). 
Finally, the share of rented land is also low in Romania – according to the FSS data and 
national statistics, only 17% of agricultural land is rented. Romania (or at least the majority of 
the country) can be characterised as a labour-intensive agricultural economy where land has 
been distributed in kind to rural households, with 65% of agricultural land being used by 
farms for which the holder is a natural person (typically small-scale family farms). In such 
countries, there is relatively little renting. At the same time, renting is important in Romania 
for the large-scale farms, which cultivate 35% of the UAA. In 2007, legal entities rented on 
average 36% of the land they cultivated, while the figure for family farms was only 7% 
(Swinnen and Vranken, 2010). 
3. Rental prices 
In several EU member states, governments have imposed price restrictions on agricultural 
land rental markets. These price restrictions may take the form of maximum or minimum 
rental prices. For example in Belgium and the Netherlands, there is a maximum rent. In 
France, there is a combination of a minimum and a maximum rent. In addition, these 
countries have imposed a limitation on the duration of rental contracts (e.g. a minimum of 
nine years in Belgium). In the other OMS in the sample (Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK), there are no rental price restrictions. Also in the NMS, 
there are no price restrictions on rental prices for agricultural land. An overview of the 
existing regulations restricting land rental prices in EU member states is given in the Factor 
Markets paper by Ciaian et al. (2012b). 
This section illustrates the differences in rental prices among member states and the 
evolution of rental prices over the periods 1995–2008 (for the OMS) and 2004–08 (for the 
NMS). Data on the evolution of rental prices have been deflated using the EU-25 GDP 
deflator. As in the case of the share of rented land, along with national statistics we consider 
two other data sources: Eurostat and FADN. 
Eurostat provides rental price data on some of the member states. Data on agricultural land 
prices come ultimately from national administrative sources and are in most cases collected 
by means of special surveys. In general though, the available data are rather incomplete. 
In addition, there are rental price data calculated from the FADN dataset. Rent per hectare is 
constructed by dividing two FADN variables: “Rent paid” (SE375) and “Rented UAA” 
(SE030). Notably, the variable “Rent paid” is only a proxy for the rental cost of agricultural 
land, because in addition to the cost of renting land, “Rent paid” includes the rental cost for 
buildings. Furthermore, we should keep in mind that the smallest farms, which may also 
participate in the agricultural land market, are excluded from the FADN sample. For 
example, for the year 2005 the FADN data represented 43% of agricultural holdings and 92% 
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of the total UAA. Despite these limitations, we believe that the FADN dataset provides 
internationally comparable survey data for all the countries in our sample. Moreover, the 
rental coverage in Eurostat and national statistical data is incomplete. 
Based on the available data, there are substantial differences in the agricultural rental prices 
in the member states. Figure 5 shows the average rental price for agricultural land in 2008 in 
the selected member states based on the FADN data. Table 4 also provides a comparison of 
rental prices calculated based on FADN data and data obtained from Eurostat. It appears that 
there are significant differences between the two datasets, but as already argued we rely 
mostly on the FADN data because these data are the most complete and comparable for all 
the member states. 
Figure 5. Rental prices for agricultural land in 2008 (€/ha) 
 
Source: FADN (2011). 
Table 4. Rental prices for agricultural land in 2008 (€/ha) 
Old member states 
 Eurostat FADN 
Belgium - 237 
Germany - 220 
Greece 502* 273 
Finland 174** 195 
France  130*** 158 
Ireland 185*** 232 
Italy  - 177 
Netherlands 469 895 
Spain  168 119 
Sweden 126 166 
UK 205** 124 
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Table 4. cont’d 
New member states 
 Eurostat FADN 
Bulgaria 115* 78 
Czech Republic - 53 
Estonia - 12 
Hungary 93 82 
Latvia - 15 
Lithuania 43 31 
Poland - 57 
Romania - 68 
Slovakia 18 69 
* Rental prices for arable land; ** data from 2007; *** data from 2006 
Sources: Data in the first column have been obtained from Eurostat (2007) and data in the second 
column are based on calculations from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) (2008). 
First, it can be observed that there is a large divergence between rental prices in the OMS and 
the NMS. For example, in Estonia, renting 1 ha of agricultural land costs approximately €12 
per year, while in the Netherlands, a farmer pays on average €895. These substantial 
differences relate to such factors as land productivity, farm structure and income differences 
between the OMS and the NMS. 
Second, within the group of OMS, there is also substantial variation in the rental prices. For 
example, in the Netherlands rental prices are very high (€895/ha), while they are much lower 
in Spain (€119/ha) and Portugal (€56/ha). In this case, the disparities relate not only to 
differences in income among member states, but also to farm structure, agricultural 
profitability and the interaction with policy regulations (e.g. increased demand for land to 
comply with the Nitrates Directive in countries where there is a manure surplus, such as 
Denmark), which may lead to higher rental prices. 
Third, within a country there can be substantial variation in rental prices. For example, in 
Germany the ratio of rental prices in West and East Germany was almost 2:1 in 2005 (Ciaian 
et al., 2010). There are a number of explanations for this gap in rental prices between East 
and West Germany. For instance, according to Balmann (1999), rental price differences stem 
from the relatively low livestock density in East Germany and the unexploited returns to scale 
of the family farms that dominated the agricultural sector in West Germany. Another 
explanation lies in the way the rental contracts were awarded by the company that managed 
state-owned land in Eastern Germany, the Bodenverwertungs und verwaltungs GmbH 
(BVVG). The administrative prices set by the BVVG served as a focal point for the rental 
market. Although this procedure has changed in recent years, the effects are still present 
owing to the often long duration of rental contracts. 
Finally, it is important to note that these official statistics may underestimate the rental 
prices in some member states, as they do not take into account ‘grey’ payments, which are 
particularly important in the rental markets of Belgium and the Netherlands (see Box 2).  
With respect to the candidate countries, there are no internationally comparable data on 
rental prices available in the FADN or Eurostat databases. Therefore, we are only able to 
present data based on national statistics obtained from Bojnec (2011). In the FYROM, the 
government stipulates a minimum rental price for state-owned agricultural land, which 
varies by land quality: €25 per ha for high quality land, €15 per ha for medium quality land, 
and €15 to €5 for land in mountain areas. Overall, the average rental price in the country is 
€15 per ha for agricultural land and €25 per ha for arable land. In the other two candidate 
countries, Croatia and Turkey, rental prices are not regulated. But there is no information on 
the average rental price for agricultural or arable land in either country. In Turkey, land 
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rental often takes place under sharecropping contracts, where traditionally a third of the 
produce is paid to the landowner.  
Box 2. The ‘grey’ rental sector in the Netherlands and Belgium 
In both the Netherlands and Belgium, the government set regional rent ceilings and allowed 
only very modest rent adjustments each year. Ironically, these measures, which aimed at 
protecting tenants and offering them tenure security for many years, had the opposite result 
(Swinnen, 2002). To circumvent the strict regulations, a ‘grey’ rental sector evolved and 
farmers entered into informal contracts with landowners. In the Netherlands, prices were 
sometimes on average 50% higher than the officially registered rents and by 1995, grey rents 
accounted for 25% of the total rented area in the Netherlands (Hoek and Luijt, 1999). In 
Belgium as well, a substantial share of the rental price is grey money and hence not included in 
official statistics, as the rigidity of the tenancy market (with a minimum duration of nine years 
for a rental contract) stimulates the use of these additional payments. When a plot with a good 
location comes onto the rental market, neighbouring farmers are prepared to pay a higher price 
than the official maximum price because if they are not able to rent the plot then, it will be at 
least nine more years before the plot becomes available again. Since 2007, more liberal forms 
of rental contracts have been introduced in the Netherlands to stop the growth of the informal 
market. Rental agreements for less than six years are no longer subject to these regulations, but 
the regulations continue to apply to contracts of longer durations. 
Not only does the magnitude of the rental price differ among countries, but also the rental 
price development is heterogeneous across the EU member states, especially in the OMS. In 
some countries, such as Denmark and the Netherlands, real rental prices for agricultural land 
increased over the period 1995–2008, while in other countries, such as Greece and Ireland, 
they fell over the same period. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the real rental price in the 
OMS based on the FADN data. 
The heterogeneity in the evolution of rental prices in the OMS is in contrast to that which 
took place in the NMS, where agricultural land rents in all countries sharply increased over 
the period 2004–08 (Figure 7). There are differences, however, in the speed and the 
magnitude of the rental price increases. For example, in the Czech Republic nominal 
agricultural land rents rose from €29/ha in 2004 to €53/ha in 2008, while in Slovakia, the 
increase in land rents was more moderate, with nominal rental prices for land rising from 
€23/ha in 2004 to €29/ha in 2008. 
In general, we can distinguish three distinct patterns in rental price developments: i) 
countries where agricultural land prices decreased in the period 1995–2008, such as Austria 
(-12%), the UK (-18%), Portugal (-25%), Greece (-27%) and Ireland (-36%); ii) countries 
where the change in rental price was relative small over that period, such as Italy (8%), 
Belgium (4%), Finland (1%), France (-7%) and Germany (-5%); and iii) countries where 
agricultural land rents increased in the period 1995–2008 (for the OMS) and the period 
2004–08 (for the NMS). These include the following countries of the OMS: the Netherlands 
(36%), Sweden (36%), Denmark (45%) and Spain (81%). The NMS that fit this pattern are 
Slovakia (14%), Hungary (36%), Poland (44%), Latvia (45%), the Czech Republic (69%), 
Estonia (92%), Lithuania (110%) and Slovenia (115%). 
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Figure 6. Evolution of the deflated rental prices for agricultural land in the OMS (€/ha) 
 
Note: Prices are deflated using the EU-25 GDP deflator and expressed in 2000 prices. 
Source: FADN (2011). 
Figure 7. Evolution of the deflated rental prices for agricultural land in the NMS (€/ha) 
 
Note: Prices are deflated using the EU-25 GDP deflator and expressed in 2000 prices. 
Source: FADN (2011). 
The changes in land rental prices (in percentages) since the reference year (1995 for the OMS 
and 2004 for the NMS) are given in Figure 8 for the OMS and Figure 9 for the NMS.  
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Figure 8. Percentage change in the deflated rental prices for agricultural land in the OMS 
(%) 
 
Note: Prices are deflated using the EU-25 GDP deflator and expressed in 2000 prices. 
Source: FADN (2011). 
Figure 9. Percentage change in the deflated rental prices for agricultural land in the NMS 
(%) 
 
Note: Prices are deflated using the EU-25 GDP deflator and expressed in 2000 prices. 
Source: FADN (2011). 
 
3.1 Countries with decreasing rental prices for agricultural land 
Based on FADN data for rental prices in the UK, we found that rental prices increased in this 
country until the end of the 1990s. Yet subsequently, prices stabilised and after 2004 real 
rental prices even decreased (-40% between 2004 and 2008). These evolutions are confirmed 
by the data on agricultural rental prices collected by the British government agency Defra, 
although these data show a smaller decline in rental prices in the years after 2004 (Figure 
10). 
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In addition to national averages, Defra also provides regional data, which show substantial 
regional variations in the evolution of land rental prices. Average rents in Scotland grew 
significantly during the 1990s, but this growth died off and prices have actually fallen since 
2004. Rents in Northern Ireland are also reported to have decreased significantly since 1997. 
Figure 10. Index of average rent in the UK (2000=100) 
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Source: Defra (2008), obtained by Ciaian et al. (2010). 
For England, Figure 11 shows data on the average rent paid for full agricultural tenancies, 
which are long-term (often inter-generational) leases for which the average rental price tends 
to remain relatively stable over time. The decrease in rental prices at the beginning of the 
2000s was symptomatic of the returns to agriculture in those years. Tenants with rent 
reviews during that period pleaded hardship and landlords agreed on a lower level of rental 
prices. For such short-term contracts as Farm Business Tenancies, rents have declined 
substantially because these short-term agreements better represent the prevailing market for 
leased land (in terms of supply and demand), with farmers being shrewd when considering 
the economic benefits of taking on additional land. The decline in rental prices for these 
short-term contracts has taken place in all sectors except for the dairy sector, where rental 
prices have remained stable. 
Overall, there is substantial regional variation in the level of agricultural land rents. Table 5 
provides information on the regional differences in rental prices in the UK for rental 
contracts under the Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995 (ATA) and under the Agricultural 
Holdings Act 1986 (AHA) in 2010. For the AHA contracts, rental prices varied between 
£147/ha in Wales and £186/ha in the north-west region. For ATA contracts, prices were 
generally higher and varied between £217/ha in the south-east and £287/ha in the eastern 
region. 
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Figure 11. Average rents: Farm business tenancies in England 
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Source: Defra (2008), obtained by Ciaian et al. (2010). 
Table 5. Land rental prices in the UK in 2010 (£/ha) 
 AHA* ATA** 
Eastern 172 287 
East Midlands 161 281 
North-east 153 238 
North-west 186 272 
South-east 161 217 
South-west 148 244 
Wales 147 260 
West Midlands 167 272 
Yorkshire and Humberside 158 269 
* Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995; ** Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 
Source: RICS (2010). 
In Ireland, real rental rates for agricultural land decreased substantially over the ten-year 
period compared with the reference year (1995), with agricultural rents decreasing by 36% – 
the largest decrease among all member states. 
In Greece, rental prices remained relatively stable until 2005, after which prices started to 
decline. In general, rents are paid in cash, but occasionally tenants prefer to give landowners 
part of their production in kind (up to 30-50% of total production). 
According to national statistics, rental prices vary among regions in Greece, but they are in 
general much lower compared with rental prices obtained from FADN (Table 6). A significant 
share of agricultural land is located in mountainous areas, whereas the remaining share is 
close to coastal tourist areas, where rental prices are substantially higher. 
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Table 6. Agricultural rental prices in Crete in 2007 (€/acre) 
 Plain area Mountainous area Glasshouses 
 Non-irrigated 
land 
Irrigated 
land 
Non-irrigated 
land 
Irrigated 
land 
 
Heraklion 27.20 66.20 16.32 39.72 392.05 
Lasithi 18.14 46.55 10.88 27.93 271.44 
Chania 27.20 66.20 16.32 39.72 392.05 
Rethimno 18.14 46.55 10.88 27.93 271.44 
Sources: Ministry of Economics and Finance, obtained by Ciaian et al. (2010). 
3.2 Countries with stable rental prices for agricultural land 
In Italy, the average agricultural land rent based on FADN data increased by approximately 
8% compared with the reference year (1995); by 2008, the average rental price per hectare 
was approximately €177. But national statistics suggest even higher rental prices, which 
nonetheless differ significantly among regions and types of agricultural production, reflecting 
differences in land quality (Tables 7 and 8). Prices are highest in the northern and eastern 
regions of Italy (€1,072/ha) and for land used for flower production (€2,203/ha), while they 
are lowest in the southern region (€716/ha) and for land used for fruit production (€125/ha). 
Table 7. Regional differences in rental prices in Italy in 2009 (€/ha) 
Region Average 
North-eastern 1,072 
North-western 844 
Centre 550 
Southern 753 
Isles 716 
Source: Povellato (2010). 
Table 8.Sectoral differences in rental prices in Italy in 2009 (€/ha) 
Region Average 
Arable crops 635 
Flowers and nursery 2,203 
Forest 125 
Fruit 1,122 
Grassland and pasture 175 
Olive oil plantation 538 
Vineyards 1,434 
Source: Povellato (2010). 
In Belgium, agricultural land rents are strongly regulated by set maximum prices, depending 
on the region. In most cases the maximum rental price, as determined by the government, is 
paid. The additional amount that is paid varies depending on the circumstances, but it can be 
substantial. In recent years, there has also been an increase in seasonal and informal 
contracts, which is related to the low official tenancy prices, the introduction of direct 
payments and uncertainty over zoning regulations. Because of data paucity, it is not possible 
to quantify the evolution of either the additional payments or the number of seasonal 
contracts. 
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Given that prices are determined for each agricultural district, there are also regional price 
differences among the provinces (Figure 12). National statistics suggest that average prices in 
Flanders are 38% (arable) and 30% (permanent grassland) higher than in Wallonia.6 Prices 
also increased in Flanders at the end of the 1990s, but remained stable in Wallonia. These 
disparities in prices can be explained by differences in soil quality, which are in turn reflected 
by variations in the cadastral income, and mainly in profitability, as well as in the tenancy 
coefficients.  
Figure 12. Regional differences in the rental prices in Belgium in 2006 
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Source: FOD Economie, KMO, Middenstand en Energie (2008). 
In France, the average rental price for agricultural land slightly increased from €130/ha in 
1995 to €158/ha in 2008, based on the FADN data. Still, these negligible changes are not 
representative for the land market trends in this country, since rental markets for agricultural 
land are heavily regulated in France (see Ciaian et al., 2012b). 
Also in Germany, the average agricultural land rents were relatively stable over the period 
1995–2008. Furthermore, national statistics show that there is still a substantial price gap 
between rental prices in East and West Germany with a ratio of almost 2:1. There are several 
explanations for this difference (Balmann, 1999): a low livestock density in East Germany, 
unexploited returns to scale by family farms in West Germany and the importance of the 
administrative prices set by BVVG as a focal point for the rental market. Although this has 
changed in recent years, the effects are still present because of the often long duration of 
rental contracts. The states with the highest rental prices are North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower 
Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, whereas the lowest prices can be found in Brandenburg, 
Saarland and Saxony (Table 9). 
                                                        
6 Note that the provinces Antwerpen, Limburg, Oost-Vlaanderen, West-Vlaanderen and Vlaams 
Brabant are a part of Flanders, while Waals Brabant, Henegouwen, Luik, Luxemburg and Namen 
belong to Wallonia.  
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Table 9. Land rental prices in Germany in 2007 (€/ha) 
 
Agricultural land 
(arable land and pasture) Arable land 
Germany 183 205 
   
Baden-Württemberg 189 210 
Bayern 235 273 
Brandenburg 80 86 
Hessen 140 173 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 125 138 
Niedersachsen 279 322 
Nordrhein-Westfalen 312 366 
Rheinland-Pfalz 192 187 
Saarland 85 96 
Sachsen 116 126 
Sachsen-Anhalt 172 194 
Schleswig-Holstein 261 293 
Thüringen 120 137 
Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg 191 199 
Source: National statistics. 
3.3 Countries with increasing rental prices for agricultural land 
Countries with increasing rental prices for agricultural land in the OMS include the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Spain, and in the NMS they include Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Latvia, the Czech Republic and Estonia, Lithuania. 
In the Netherlands, the rental prices calculated based on the FADN data are very high and 
increased substantially over the period 1995–2008. On average, the rental price per hectare 
of agricultural land in 1995 was €503, but by 2008, it had increased to €895. Before 1995, 
rental prices were heavily regulated and prices were kept artificially low. After the 
introduction of more liberal contract types, rents immediately caught up to their economic 
levels.  
In Spain, the average rental price of FADN farms in 1995 was €50/ha in current values, 
which managed to reach €118/ha in 2008. But once again, important divergences appear in 
terms of crops and communities (Ciaian et al., 2010). National data show that in 2006, the 
highest land rents were paid in the Canaries (€1,042/ha), Murcia (€511/ha) and Andalusia 
(€370/ha), while the lowest appear to have been in the Balearics (€91/ha) and Aragon 
(€109/ha). Land with irrigation crops was leased at an average rate of €487/ha in the same 
year, followed by olive groves at €410/ha, with the lowest rental prices paid for pasturelands 
(€52/ha). 
In Sweden, agricultural rental prices have increased since 1995. Rental prices rose at a faster 
rate in the late 1990s than at the beginning of the 2000s. There is variation in rental prices 
among different parts of the country, with rents having increased over the entire period in all 
regions except the most northern part of the country. Renting land in the plains in southern 
Sweden costs about 8.5 times as much as renting land in northern Sweden.  
In all the NMS, the agricultural land rents paid by FADN farms have increased considerably, 
underlined by national statistical evidence also showing a significant rise in land rents 
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(Figure 13).7 Moreover, based on these data, we find that especially since EU accession, 
agricultural land rents have exploded. This is illustrated by Figure 14, which represents the 
share of farms that experienced an increase in land rental prices in Slovakia over the period 
1993–2006. These data show that especially in 2004 (the year of EU accession) and 2005, 
rental prices rapidly increased.  
Figure 13. Evolution of land rents in the NMS (€/ha; based on national statistics)* 
 
* Real 2010 prices 
Source: National statistics obtained by Van Herck et al. (2011). 
Figure 14. Share of farms with an increase in land rental prices in Slovakia by year 
 
Source: Swinnen and Vranken (2009). 
 
                                                        
7 Note there are differences between data obtained from FADN and national statistics. We have already 
indicated that agricultural rents in FADN data are an imperfect measure, as they also include the rents 
paid for agricultural buildings. At the same time, there is an additional concern that we should keep in 
mind when considering the FADN data: FADN data do not include very small farm holdings, which, 
especially in the NMS, still represent a large proportion of the farm population. The data presented in 
Figure 13 have been obtained from national statistics (various sources), by Swinnen and Vranken 
(2009) and Van Herck et al. (2011), where the data sources are documented in detail. 
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An important driver of the increase in land rents may have been the increase in direct 
payments, which are (at least partially) capitalised into land rents. Figure 15 shows the 
evolution of direct payments in the different NMS. The extent to which the direct payments 
are capitalised and the interactions with the specific conditions in the rental markets of the 
NMS are the subject of future research in the Factor Markets project. 
At the same time, there is wide variation in the level of agricultural land rents among the 
NMS. The lowest annual rental prices were found in Latvia, while rental prices in Slovakia 
and Lithuania were somewhat below those in the Czech Republic. The highest rental prices 
were found in Hungary and Poland. 
In addition, just as in several OMS, the rental prices within a NMS may show substantial 
differences. For example in Bulgaria, rental prices depend on the quality of the agricultural 
land (Swinnen and Vranken, 2010). 
Figure 15. Evolution of direct payments in the NMS (€/ha) 
 
* Real 2010 prices 
Source: National statistics obtained by Van Herck, et al. (2011). 
The ratio of land rental over land sales prices also shows notable differences among the 
countries. In the Czech and Slovak Republics, the land rental price is only 0.5% of the land 
sales price. This ratio is considerably lower than that in Poland, where the land rental price is 
around 2% of the land sales price and the disparities with Lithuania (6%) and Hungary (8%) 
are even larger. Even if there are also differences in the land rental–land sales price ratio 
among EU-15 countries, this ratio is never less than 2% in the 15 OMS of our sample. 
The fact that there is such variation in the ratio of land rental over land sales prices 
(particularly in the cases of Slovakia and the Czech Republic) suggests that there are some 
structural differences in the functioning of the rental and sales markets in these countries. 
There are two possible hypotheses on this matter. One hypothesis is that some agricultural 
land is bought for non-farm purposes, which thereby increases sales prices. A second 
hypothesis is that the average land-rental prices in Slovakia reflect a mixture of rental by 
farming companies, cooperatives and individual/family farms. The corporate farms, and 
especially the cooperatives, pay much less rent. Since corporate farms still use the vast 
majority of agricultural land and dominate the land rental market, they may abuse their 
market power to keep rental prices low (Box 3). 
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Box 3. Large differences in rental prices for alternative farm structures in Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic 
Several studies document that land markets in the NMS, even in the most advanced countries, 
are characterised by the existence of substantial transaction costs in rural land markets, 
hindering land exchanges (Dale and Baldwin, 2000; Lerman et al., 2004). Transaction costs 
include those related to bargaining costs, the enforcement of withdrawal rights, asymmetric 
information and unclear boundaries. Uncertainty and high costs in the identification of land 
property rights may also lead to soaring transaction costs and constraints on land transactions. 
There is some evidence that corporate farms reduce payments by paying in kind instead of in 
cash, since these in-kind payments by corporate farms are less transparent. The in-kind 
payments often depend on yields, which are difficult for landowners to control, and result in 
lower effective rent payments. Table 10 gives an overview of the differences in rental prices 
paid by family farms and legal entities. 
Table 10. Agricultural land rental prices paid by family farms and legal entities (€/ha) 
  1997  2001  2005 
Czech Republic       
Individual farms (€/ha)  16  23  35 
Corporate farms (€/ha)  9  17  30 
Price gap in € (PIF‐PCF)  7  6  5 
Price gap in % (PIF‐PCF)/ PCF  73  37  15 
Slovakia       
Individual farms (€/ha)  –  18  24 
Corporate farms (€/ha)  –  6  17 
Price gap in € (PIF‐PCF)  –  13  7 
Price gap in % (PIF‐PCF)/ PCF  –  229  45 
 
Sources: FADN for Slovakia and VUZE for the Czech Republic. 
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